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DOCKET NO. 40769 
Elmore Co. Case No. 
CV-2009-1408 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' October 10, 
2014 opinion in this case. Severson v. State, Docket No. 40769, 2014 Opinion 
No. 85 (Idaho App., Oct. 10, 2014) (hereinafter "Opinion" (attached hereto as 
Appendix A)). The Court of Appeals decided that this Court's majority opinion in 
Severson's direct appeal regarding Severson's claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct had limited or no preclusive effect in relation to Severson's post-
conviction claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
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prosecutor's statements. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
distinguished between statements reviewed for fundamental error and 
statements reviewed pursuant to an objection, and found that "issues disposed 
of under the fundamental error standard applied in direct appeal are not barred 
by res judicata" in post-conviction. (Opinion, p.10 (capitalization altered).) 
Because this is an issue of substance not heretofore determined by this Court, 
review is appropriate to determine if the Court of Appeals' conclusion was 
correct. 
Review is also appropriate because the Idaho Court of Appeals declined 
to affirm the summary dismissal of Severson's petition on the alternative ground 
that Severson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact; the Court of 
Appeals instead indicated the state could raise the alternative grounds "anew 
upon remand." (Opinion, p.11 n.5.) This resolution is not in accord with prior 
decisions of this Court. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings In District Court 
In 2004, a jury convicted Severson of the first-degree murder of his wife, 
Mary, and of poisoning her food and/or medicine. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
694, 700-701, 215 P.3d 414, 420-421 (2009). The court imposed a fixed life 
sentence for murder and five years for poisoning. kl, 147 Idaho at 701, 215 
P.3d at 421. This Court affirmed Severson's convictions. kl, 147 Idaho at 723, 
215 P.3d at 443. 
Severson filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.4-9.) The 
court entered a notice of intent to summarily dismiss some of Severson's claims 
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and appointed counsel to represent Severson. (R., pp.19-27, 34-37.) Severson, 
with the assistance of counsel, subsequently filed an amended petition and the 
state filed an answer. (R., pp.52-62, 67-85.) The state also filed two motions for 
partial summary dismissal. 1 (R., p.112; Motion for Order Granting Partial 
Summary Dismissal, filed February 13, 2012 ("First Motion") (Augmentation).) 
The district court summarily dismissed all claims raised by Severson with the 
exception of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing or refusing to have 
Severson testify at trial, which claim the court dismissed after an evidentiary 
hearing. (R., pp.114-147, 151-159, 211-235.) The court entered Judgment, 
from which Severson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.237-241.) 
Course Of Proceedings On Appeal 
On appeal, Severson raised two claims: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily denying the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in not objecting to prosecutorial 
misconduct at trial based upon the doctrine of res judicata when 
the issue before the Idaho Supreme Court in direct appeal was 
whether the prosecutorial misconduct was fundamental error and 
the claim in post-conviction was ineffective assistance of counsel 
which is controlled by the Strickland analysis of whether defense 
counsel's performance was deficient and if so whether the 
deficiency was prejudicial? 
1 It appears the state had to file two motions for summary dismissal because, 
after the state filed its first motion in response to Severson's amended petition, 
Severson advised the court that the claims in his amended petition were "in 
addition to the claims in the original petition." (R., pp.112, 114.) Thus, the state's 
second motion sought dismissal "of the claims raised in Severson's initial petition 
with the exception of Severson's claim that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing or refusing to permit Severson to testify in his own defense 
at trial" (R., p.112) whereas the state's first motion sought dismissal of all claims 
"raised in Severson's amended petition" with the same exception (First Motion 
(Augmentation).) 
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2. Did Mr. Severson raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel by 
counsels' failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct in the State's 
closing arguments? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief"), pp.4-5.) 
Addressing Severson's first claim, the Court of Appeals stated: 
The closing argument statements raised in the post-
conviction action are identical to those raised by the dissent in the 
direct appeal. We need not address each individual statement 
because we conclude, with one exception, that all of them fall 
within one of two general categories. First, there are statements 
that were not addressed by the majority opinion in the direct 
appeal. Second, there are statements that the Idaho Supreme 
Court disposed of under the fundamental error rule applicable at 
the time. 
(Opinion, p.9. (footnote omitted).) 
The "one exception" the Court identified "relates to prosecutorial 
references during closing argument to the age of Severson's paramour including 
references to her as a '21-year-old-tramp' and 'screwing some 21-year-old."' 
(Opinion, p.9 n.2.) The Court of Appeals concluded that this Court's "limited 
ruling" that "these statements were 'inflammatory and, therefore, improper, but 
'did not result in prejudice ... given the weight of the evidence against Severson 
and the numerous limiting instructions issued by the judge" does "become[ ] res 
judicata within the context of Severson's larger Post-Conviction Act claim, and 
any references to or reliance upon these statements may be disposed of by way 
of summary dismissal upon remand." (Opinion, p.9 n.2 (quoting Severson, 147 
ldahoat720-721, 215 P.3d at440-441).) 
With respect to this Court's majority resolution of the misconduct claims 
Severson raised, the Court of Appeals rejected the state's assertion that, 
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because this Court ultimately concluded Severson was not entitled to a new trial 
based on the allegations, Severson cannot establish prejudice for an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim that is based on counsel's failure to object to those 
same statements. (Opinion, p.10.) The Court of Appeals reasoned that, 
because this Court "did not dispose of Severson's claim based upon harmless 
error, but concluded that he failed to show fundamental error" under the pre-
Perry2 standard3 and that standard, according to the Court of Appeals, is "far 
more exacting than the standard under which the prejudice prong of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is adjudicated." (Opinion, p.11.) Thus, 
the Court of Appeals concluded, "a determination that a comment was not 
fundamental error, under the standard used in Severson, has no preclusive 
effect because the issue is not identical," and reversed the district court's order 
granting summary dismissal. (Opinion, p.11.) In addition, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the summary dismissal order even though it recognized "that the 
2 State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
3 The year after it issued Severson, the Idaho Supreme Court restated the 
fundamental error standard of review applicable to unobjected to claims of error 
and "expressly disavowed [the] definition of 'fundamental error"' that was recited 
in Severson. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). The 
test for unobjected to fundamental error the Court adopted in Perry requires (1) 
the defendant to "demonstrate that one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional 
rights were violated"; (2) "the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for 
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision"; and (3) 
"the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, 
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. The Court of Appeals 
specifically declined to consider the "preclusive effect of a fundamental error 
ruling under the Perry standard." (Opinion, p.10 n.3.) 
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State's motion for summary dismissal asserted alternative grounds for relief'; 
rather than consider the alternative grounds, the Court of Appeals said the 
"viability of those claims [could] be raised anew upon remand." (Opinion, p.11 
n.5.) 
The state filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUE ON REVIEW 
1. Is review proper because the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this 
Court's resolution of substantive issues under the rubric of fundamental error in 
Severson's direct appeal had no preclusive effect in relation to Severson's post-
conviction claim that counsel was ineffective in relation to those same 
substantive issues is a question of substance not heretofore determined by this 
Court? 
2. Is review proper because the Court of Appeals, contrary to precedent from 
this Court, declined to consider whether summary dismissal was appropriate for 
the alternative reason that Severson failed to allege a genuine issue of material 
fact in support of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 




Any Issue Actually Decided By This Court On Direct Appeal Should Preclude 
Relitigation Of That Issue In Post-Conviction Even If The Issue Was Decided 
Pursuant To Review Under The Fundamental Error Standard 
In the "Third Cause of Action" of Severson's post-conviction petition, 
Severson "submit[ted]" that the dissenting opinion "establish[es] that [he] 
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object in the 
state's closing arguments." (R., p.61.) Severson did not identify any particular 
statements from the prosecutor's closing argument that he believed his counsel 
should have objected to, discuss how any of those statements were addressed 
by the majority on direct appeal, submit any evidence, or elaborate on this claim. 
(See R., p.61; see also p.144 (noting Severson did not address this claim "in 
affidavits" or "in the response brief and the amended petition only mentions the 
dissenting opinion and the concurrence in the dissent as [the] basis for [the] 
allegation").) Instead, Severson apparently expected the trial court to review the 
dissenting opinion from the direct appeal and adopt the same result the dissent 
would have reached - a new trial. 
In seeking summary dismissal of Severson's Third Cause of Action, the 
state asserted Severson "failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of deficient performance, much less prejudice." (Brief in Support of 
Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal ("Brief"), p.41 
(Augmentation).) The state detailed how the majority of this Court resolved each 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (Brief, pp.41-43.) Finally, the state 
contended that because Severson "failed to allege any prejudice relating to the 
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prosecutor's closing argument beyond that identified by the dissent on direct 
appeal, the majority's contrary opinion finding no prejudice is dispositive of and 
is, in fact, res judicata as to the prejudice prong of Severson's Third Cause of 
Action." (Id. at p.43.) The district court dismissed Severson's Third Cause of 
Action, stating it declined to relitigate this Court's "finding that there was no 
fundamental error in the comments" and finding the "doctrine of res judicata" 
barred Severson from raising the same "legal issues" he raised on direct appeal 
in post-conviction. (R., p.144.) 
In addressing the applicability of res judicata to Severson's Third Cause of 
Action, the Court of Appeals distinguished between prosecutorial statements that 
were considered on direct appeal under the framework of objected-to error and 
statements that were considered under the fundamental error standard of 
review. (Opinion, p.9.) According to the Court of Appeals, this Court's review of 
objected-to statements is entitled to preclusive effect in post-conviction, but 
review of statements for fundamental error is not. This distinction is erroneous. 
A review of this Court's opinion on direct appeal illustrates why. 
For example, one of the prosecutor's statements challenged on direct 
appeal, which this Court reviewed for fundamental error, was based on the 
prosecutor's comment that "Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened 
between them." Severson, 147 Idaho at 718, 215 P.3d at 438. The majority 
rejected Severson's argument that this was an improper comment on Severson's 
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself because it could be "accorded 
other meanings." .!fl at 719, 215 P.3d at 439. The dissent took a different view, 
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finding the statement was "the most egregious and offensive of all comments 
made during closing arguments." kl at 726, 215 P.3d at 446. To conclude that 
the majority's finding that the comment was not erroneous has no preclusive 
effect in post-conviction merely because it was subject to fundamental error 
review does not withstand analysis because this Court's determination that the 
statement was not improper would resolve both prongs of the analysis applicable 
to ineffective assistance of counsel claims - deficient performance and 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The Court of 
Appeals' contrary conclusion is particularly troubling where, as here, the 
petitioner's only "evidence" is based on a position rejected by a majority of this 
Court. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that issues reviewed on direct appeal 
under fundamental error have no preclusive effect to related claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel raised in subsequent post-conviction proceedings was 
erroneous and should be reviewed by this Court. 
11. 
The Court Of Appeals' Failure To Decide Whether Summary Dismissal Was 
Appropriate For The Alternative Reason That Severson Failed To Allege A 
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact To Support His Claim That Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Failing To Object To The Prosecutor's Closing Argument Is 
Inconsistent With This Court's Precedent 
The Court of Appeals also found that those statements the dissent was 
troubled by that were not addressed in any capacity by the majority because they 
were not raised by Severson on appeal could not be subject to any res judicata 
effect. (Opinion, pp.9-10.) That may be true as to the statements themselves in 
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terms of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to them; however, 
this does not end the analysis for purposes of deciding whether summary 
dismissal was appropriate because the Court must still decide whether Severson 
alleged a genuine issue of material fact to support his claim. This is true for all 
complained-of statements in the prosecutor's closing argument, including those 
addressed by the majority and any additional statements identified by the 
dissent. 
To survive summary dismissal, Severson was required to allege a prima 
facie case of both deficient performance and prejudice. "The question is whether 
an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing 
professional norms, not whether it deviated from best practices or most common 
custom." Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 740 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690). "From a strategic perspective ... , many trial lawyers refrain from 
objecting during closing argument to all but the most egregious misstatements by 
opposing counsel on the theory that the jury may construe their objections to be 
a sign of desperation or hyper-technicality." United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 
1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991). A defense attorney may also decide not to object 
because he believes the prosecutor's argument is helpful to his case or believes 
he can capitalize on the prosecutor's statements during his own closing 
argument. kl; see also Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 564 (ih Cir. 2004) 
("Under Strickland, we must note that there may very well be strategic reasons 
for counsel not to object during closing arguments. Counsel may have been 
trying to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving them more 
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force."); United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (counsel's 
decision not to object to the prosecutor's closing argument "falls within the range 
of permissible conduct of trial counsel"). "Whatever the actual explanation, 
Strickland requires [the Court} to 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' 
Molina, 934 F.2d at 1448 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "This 
presumption especially applies to silence in the face of allegedly improper 
arguments." Vicory v. State, 81 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo. App. 2002) (citation 
omitted). 
Severson failed to allege any facts sufficient to overcome the presumption 
that counsel's decision not to object was anything but a reasonable, tactical 
decision. Indeed, he alleged no facts whatsoever in this regard, instead resting 
his entire claim on his belief that the dissenting opinion on direct appeal 
"establish[es] that [he] received ineffective assistance of counsel due to 
counsel's failure to object in the state's closing arguments." (R., p.61.) That two 
dissenting Justices thought certain comments were objectionable does not, 
however, mean that counsel's decision not to object was anything but strategic, 
nor does it mean the comments were objectionable especially since the majority 
did not entirely agree. 
To demonstrate prejudice on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Severson "must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's 
deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014) (quotations and 
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citation omitted). "'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."' kl (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 
S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)). ''To undermine confidence in the outcome requires a 
substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result." Murray, 156 
Idaho at_, 321 P.3d at 714. 
Severson alleged no basis for concluding that, had counsel objected at 
the time any of the statements were made, the trial court would have declared a 
mistrial nor is there a "reasonable probability that the jury could have acquitted if 
an objection had stopped the misconduct" (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18). At best, 
the district court may have sustained an objection and reminded the jury, as it did 
on "several occasions that statements made by counsel were not to be regarded 
as evidence." Severson, 147 Idaho at 721 n.35, 215 P.3d at 441 n.35. 
In terms of prejudice, the Court of Appeals concluded that, "[t]o the extent 
the prior fundamental error standard [that this Court employed on direct appeal] 
included a determination of prejudice, that standard would be far more exacting 
than the standard under which the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is adjudicated." (Opinion, p.11.) First, the pre-Perry fundamental 
error standard unquestionably included a determination of prejudice. That much 
is apparent from this Court's opinion on direct appeal when it noted, in relation to 
one of Severson's complaints about the prosecutor's closing argument, that the 
"statement did not deprive Severson of due process or render his trial 
fundamentally unfair." Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439. The Court 
made this same observation in relation to other statements. kl (regarding the 
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statements that referred to "Mary's body providing evidence about the 
circumstances surrounding her death"); kl at 720, 215 P.3d at 440 (regarding 
the "prosecutor's references to Mary's family"). 
Second, that the prejudice standard under fundamental error is "far more 
exacting" than the prejudice standard under Strickland does not support a finding 
that summary dismissal was improper. To the contrary, the state submits that if 
Severson could not meet his burden of showing reversible error on direct appeal, 
he cannot meet his burden of showing he is entitled to a new trial under the 
Strickland standard. Perhaps more importantly, that question is not one that 
needs to be resolved after an evidentiary hearing, but is a question that may be 
resolved at the summary dismissal stage. There is no reason to reverse the 
summary dismissal order and force the state to "raise[ ] anew" its position that 
Severson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that he was prejudiced 
by any of counsel's alleged deficiencies where resolution of that question 
requires nothing more than reviewing the record and rendering a decision that 
this Court will review de nova on appeal. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 
839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992) (on review of an order summarily dismissing a post-
conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to determine if a 
genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, 
would entitle the petitioner to relief). It is well-settled that this Court may affirm 
the summary dismissal of a post-conviction action if the petitioner fails to allege a 
genuine issue of material fact and had notice that dismissal was being sought on 
that basis. See DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009). 
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Because Severson failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima face case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and because he had notice that the state 
sought dismissal on this basis, the Court of Appeals, at a minimum, should have 
affirmed rather than remanding based on its disagreement with whether 
principles of res judicata were properly applied to some of the statements that 
formed the basis of Severson's Third Cause of Action. 
The Court of Appeals erred in deciding that claims reviewed for 
fundamental error under the pre-Perry standard have no res judicata effect in 
post-conviction. The Court of Appeals also erred in declining to consider 
whether summary dismissal was appropriate given Severson's failure to allege a 
genuine issue of material fact to support his claim. Review is, therefore, proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review, 
affirm the district court's order dismissing Severson's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 1 ih day of December 2014. 
I~ 
~CA M. LORELLO 
\J)leputy Attorney General 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Elmore County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. 
Order of district court granting summary dismissal on the ground of res 
judicata, reversed and case remanded. 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Deborah A. 
Whipple argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued. 
SCHWARTZMAN, Judge Pro Tern 
Larry Severson was convicted of one count of first degree murder and one count of 
poisoning food or medicine. He took a direct appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court wherein he 
contended, inter alia, that certain unobjected-to statements in the State's closing arguments 
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. This claim was denied over a two-justice dissent that 
would have concluded that these and other statements did amount to reversible error. After his 
first appeal had been adjudicated, Severson filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 
district court. Amongst other claims, he argued that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel when they failed to object to allegedly improper statements during closing arguments. 




Severson has only appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we limit our discussion of the record to those facts and 
proceedings that are relevant to this claim. 
A. Trial Proceedings 
The Idaho Supreme Court summarized the relevant factual background when 
adjudicating the direct appeal: 
Larry and Mary Severson 1 met in Colorado in 1995. After dating for a 
little over one year, the couple married and moved to Mountain Home, Idaho. By 
2001, Severson and Mary began experiencing marital problems. Then, in August 
2001, the couple separated after Mary learned that Severson was having an affair 
with a younger woman. Upon learning of the affair, Mary left Severson and 
returned to Colorado to stay with her mother. 
Initially, Mary and Severson planned on getting an uncontested divorce. 
Less than four months after the couple separated, however, Mary changed her 
mind. Instead of going forward with the divorce, Mary decided to return to Idaho 
and work on her marriage. In the meantime, Severson continued to see his 
younger girlfriend, Jennifer Watkins. Severson told Watkins that he and Mary 
were still getting divorced and even asked Watkins to marry him. Watkins 
initially accepted Severson's proposal but ended up breaking off the relationship 
before Mary returned to Idaho. 
Mary arrived back in Idaho in December 2001. Once she returned, she 
and Severson went to the local GNC store so she could purchase some 
Hydroxycut pills. Mary had started taking Hydroxycut while she was in Colorado 
in order to help her lose weight. During that time, the pills did not cause her to 
suffer any adverse side effects. Shortly after Mary began taking the pills she 
purchased with Severson, however, she started experiencing stomach pain and 
vomiting blood. This prompted Mary to inspect the pills and, upon doing so, she 
noticed that they were discolored and warm to the touch. Mary immediately quit 
taking the pills and scheduled an appointment with her doctor. At the doctor's 
office, Mary was diagnosed with an ulcer and given a prescription for Prevacid. 
During a follow-up examination, she also received a prescription for the sleep aid 
Ambien. 
On February 14, 2002, Severson called Mary's doctor and requested a 
refill of Mary's Ambien prescription. The doctor authorized the refill and 
Severson picked up the prescription later that same night. The next morning, at 
approximately 3 :00 a.m., Severson purportedly discovered Mary lying on the 
Throughout the remainder of the opinion, we refer to Larry Severson as Severson and 
Mary Severson as Mary. 
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couch not breathing. Upon finding his wife, Severson called his son and 
daughter-in-law, Mike and Nora, who immediately rushed to Severson's house. 
Once there, Nora called 911 and Mike began performing CPR on Mary. Before 
long, the paramedics arrived and transported Mary to the hospital. Efforts to 
resuscitate Mary continued in the ambulance and at the hospital, but were 
ultimately unsuccessful. Mary was pronounced dead at the hospital at 
approximately 4: 15 a.m. that same morning. An autopsy revealed that Mary had 
ingested significant amounts of the sleep aids Ambien and Unisom, however, her 
cause of death was listed as "undetermined." 
Less than one day passed before the police began investigating Severson's 
role in Mary's death. Searches of Severson's home and workplace revealed 
several pieces of evidence including a cardboard tray with broken pieces of 
Hydroxycut capsules, a pharmacy receipt for Ambien, Ambien pills under a couch 
cushion where Mary was discovered, a plastic baggie containing Unisom pills that 
was hidden inside a hat with the word "dad" printed on it, Unisom tablets in 
Mary's bathroom and car, and an empty Ambien prescription bottle. 
Additionally, two bottles of Hydroxycut and an envelope containing some 
contaminated pills were recovered from Severson's attorney, Jay Clark. 
Severson was eventually indicted on one count of first-degree murder and 
one count of poisoning food and/or medicine. Initially, the indictment alleged 
that Severson killed Mary by overdosing her with sleeping pills. It was later 
amended to include possible murder by suffocation. Although Severson objected 
to the amendment, the trial court permitted it after concluding that it did not 
charge Severson with a new offense and would not otherwise result in prejudice. 
Severson's case proceeded to trial in October 2004. At the conclusion of 
the seventeen-day trial, the trial court delivered its instructions to the jury .... 
After two days of deliberation, the jury returned a general verdict finding 
Severson guilty of both counts alleged in the indictment. The trial court . . . 
sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole for murdering his wife and 
to five years for poisoning food and/or medicine. 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 700-01, 215 P.3d 414, 420-21 (2009). 
B. The Direct Appeal 
On direct appeal, Severson raised numerous claims of error. As is relevant here, the 
Court considered a claim that several statements made by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments amounted to misconduct. 
The majority considered numerous allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. First, the 
prosecutor stated, "This is a circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but 
Mary and Larry. Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between them." Id. at 718, 
215 P.3d at 438. Severson argued that "the statement was an impermissible comment on his 
decision not to testify." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held: 
3 
Severson has failed to prove that the prosecutor's statement was an impermissible 
comment on his silence that constituted fundamental error. Although the 
statement ... could be interpreted as a reference to Severson's failure to testify, it 
could also be accorded other meanings. . . . Nothing in the statement explicitly 
called for the jury to infer Severson was guilty because of his silence or to convict 
him on that basis. In all likelihood, given the ambiguous nature of the statement, 
the prosecutor did not even consider the interpretation Severson would attach to 
it. Moreover, since the statement was a single, isolated comment made during the 
course of a seventeen-day trial, there was substantial evidence of Severson's guilt, 
and the trial court instructed the jury not to draw negative inferences from 
Severson' s failure to testify, the statement did not deprive Severson of due 
process or render his trial fundamentally unfair. 
Id. at 719,215 P.3d at 439. 
Also, the prosecutor stated that "Mary still speaks to us today. She is still telling us what 
happened that night and why she is dead. . . . Mary tells us, she speaks to us from her grave as to 
who killed her and why she died." Id. (ellipses in original). The Idaho Supreme Court held that 
"the statements were simply referring to Mary's body providing evidence about the 
circumstances surrounding her death, not to her calling out for Severson' s conviction. Because 
the statements did not result in an unfair trial or deprive Severson of due process, they were not 
fundamental error." Id. at 720,215 P.3d at 440. 
The State additionally argued that, "Mary Severson's life had purpose, and it had 
meaning. Your duty today is to give her death justice" and referenced Mary's family life, 
including time spent with her mother at Christmas. Id. The court described the statement as 
"arguably improper," but held that it did not amount to fundamental error because the 
"statements did not impact the fairness of Severson's trial or deprive him of due process." Id. 
The dissent to.ok a very different view of the prosecutor's closing arguments. It described 
the prosecutor's conduct as a "relentless and a blatant abuse of power." Id. at 723,215 P.3d at 
443 (W. Jones, J. dissenting). The dissent referenced each of the comments discussed by the 
majority, but also discussed several additional comments including an analogy comparing a 
defense argument to a contention that the crime was done by "little green aliens ... coming to us 
from Mars" and an argument that Severson had to make sure he had "done the job right, because 
by God that woman just won't die." Id. at 724-27, 215 P.3d at 444-47. The dissent concluded 
that "cumulatively, these errors taken as a whole were not harmless," and that the "relentless acts 
of the prosecutor deprived Severson of his right to a fair trial." Id. at 728, 215 P .3d at 448. 
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C. The Post-Conviction Action 
In his original pro se petition, Severson claimed that his counsel was ineffective due to 
his "failure to object ... during closing arguments." In an attached affidavit, he cited the dissent 
in the direct appeal arguing that certain statements by the prosecutor amounted to prosecutorial 
misconduct. Wbile he concedes the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that these 
statements did not amount to fundamental error, he argued that he would have prevailed if his 
attorney had preserved the error by making a contemporaneous objection. Had the attorney done 
so, the standard of review would have been more favorable. The amended petition did not set 
forth the claim with any more specificity and merely adopted the rationale of the dissent. 
The State filed a motion to dismiss, inter alia, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
discussed in this appeal. The State alleged that the majority of the Idaho Supreme Court, in its 
review of three statements made by the prosecutor in closing, found that none amounted to 
fundamental error. The State sought summary dismissal of this claim, asserting that Severson 
"failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case of deficient performance, much less 
prejudice." Additionally, the State argued that the post-conviction court should deny relief as the 
claim was barred by res judicata. In its view, the majority opinion found that Severson was not 
prejudiced and that finding was determinative of the prejudice prong of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (holding that a petitioner seeking relief for ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the 
petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency). 
The district court granted summary dismissal as to the ineffective assistance claim. In its 
view, the Idaho Supreme Court, on direct appeal, concluded that most of the comments made by 
the prosecutor were "not improper" and the other error was "not prejudicial." On this basis, it 
held that the Idaho "Supreme Court's finding that there was no fundamental error in the 
[prosecutor's closing arguments] will not be re litigated here. Wben legal issues are decided in a 
criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from 
raising them again in a post-conviction proceeding." 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Severson argues that the court should not have summarily dismissed his claim under the 
doctrine of res judicata and that there existed no alternative basis to dismiss his claim. A petition 
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for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. LC.§ 19-4907; State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 PJd 476, 
482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like 
plaintiffs in other civil actions, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the 
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 
(Ct. App. 2002). A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary 
civil action, however, in that it must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" 
that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 
199 PJd 123, 135 (2008); Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 PJd at 628. The petition must be 
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, 
records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the petition must state 
why such supporting evidence is not included. LC. § 19-4903. In other words, the petition must 
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or it will be subject 
to dismissal. Wolfv. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67,266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if "it 
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.C. § 19-4906( c). 
When considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the 
petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. Payne, 
146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. Moreover, 
because the district court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court is not constrained to draw inferences in the petitioner's favor, but is 
free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Yakovac, 145 
Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483; Wolf, 152 Idaho at 67,266 P.3d at 1172; Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 
353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if 
the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 218, 
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192 P.3d 1036, 1042 (2008); Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 P.2d at 714; Farnsworth v. 
Dairymen's Creamery Ass 'n, 125 Idaho 866, 868, 876 P .2d 148, 150 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven 
by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a 
prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do 
not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 ldaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 
(2010); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 
Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 
870, 873 (2007); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Murphy v. State, 
143 Idaho 139, 145, 139 P.3d 741, 747 (Ct. App. 2006); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 
P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is 
appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to 
relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when the State does not 
controvert the petitioner's evidence. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 
Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege 
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be 
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); 
Berg, 131 Idaho at 519,960 P.2d at 740; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932,934,801 P.2d 1283, 
1285 (1990); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008); Roman, 
125 Idaho at 64 7, 873 P .2d at 901. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521, 236 P.3d at 
1281; Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629. 
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by 
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts which, if 
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 
929 (2010); Berg, 131 Idaho at 519, 960 P.2d at 740; Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 
923; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. Over questions of law, we exercise free review. 
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,250,220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Downing v. State, 136 ldaho 
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367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 532, 944 P.2d 
127, 129 (Ct. App. 1997). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the 
attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct. App. 
1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Id at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. This Court has long adhered to the 
proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on 
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 
P.2d 261,263 (Ct. App. 1994). 
A. Principles of Res Judicata Apply in Post-Conviction Cases 
Res judicata prevents the litigation of causes of action which were finally decided in a 
previous suit. Grubler by and Through Grub/er v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 107, 110, 867 P.2d 981, 
984 (1994). See also Magic Valley Radiology P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436, 849 P.2d 
107, 109 (1993); Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 
(1990). As is relevant here, "[t]he principles ofres judicata apply when an applicant attempts to 
raise the same issues previously ruled upon on direct appeal in a subsequent application for post-
conviction relief." Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,439, 163 P.3d 222,228 (Ct. App. 2007); see 
also State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210-11, 766 P.2d 678, 680-81 (1988) (holding that the district 
court "correctly refused to relitigate" issues that had "previously been decided on direct appeal 
and thus were resjudicata"); Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 797-98, 291 P.3d 474, 480-81 (Ct. 
App. 2012) ("Idaho appellate courts have applied the related principles of res judicata to bar an 
attempt to raise, in an application for post-conviction relief, the same issue previously decided in 
a direct appeal."); State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803,811, 69 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Ct. App. 2003) (to 
the extent claims of error were addressed on direct appeal, "they are barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata"). "Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel)." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 
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(2002). At oral argument, the State conceded that claim preclusion is inapplicable. Accordingly, 
we limit our review to the question of whether issue preclusion was proper. 
The Idaho Supreme Court set forth the five-element test for issue preclusion: 
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in 
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; 
(3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; 
( 4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and ( 5) the 
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to 
the litigation. 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). 
The closing argument statements raised in the post-conviction action are identical to 
those raised by the dissent in the direct appeal. We need not address each individual statement 
because we conclude, with one exception, 2 that all of them fall within one of two general 
categories. First, there are statements that were not addressed by the majority opinion in the 
direct appeal. Second, there are statements that the Idaho Supreme Court disposed of under the 
fundamental error rule applicable at the time. 
B. Issues Not Decided in the Direct Appeal Are Not Barred by Res Judicata 
Res judicata does not apply to statements discussed by the Severson dissent that were not 
ruled upon by the Severson majority. As the State concedes, the dissent "quot[ ed] all offensive 
statements from closing arguments, even those not specifically cited to by appellant in his brief" 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 724, 215 P.3d at 444 (W. Jones, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). The 
2 This exception relates to prosecutorial references during closing argument to the age of 
Severson's paramour including references to her as a "21-year-old tramp" and "screwing some 
21-year-old." The court noted that Severson had challenged these statements by raising this 
objection to the trial court in his motion for a new trial. State v. Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694, 720, 
215 P.3d 414,440 (2009). 
The court determined that these statements were "inflammatory and, therefore, 
improper," but "did not result in prejudice, however, given the weight of the evidence against 
Severson and the numerous limiting instructions issued by the judge." Accordingly, the court 
concluded these statements "were not prosecutorial misconduct and do not justify reversing 
Severson's conviction." Id at 721,215 P.3d at 441. 
This limited ruling becomes res judicata within the context of Severson' s larger Post-
Conviction Act claim, and any references to or reliance upon these statements may be disposed 
of by way of summary dismissal upon remand. 
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majority's ruling did not discuss these statements, nor did it enter a ruling regarding them. 
Accordingly, res judicata cannot apply because the issue was not "actually decided in the prior 
litigation." See Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. 
C. Issues Disposed of Under the Fundamental Error Standard Applied in the Direct 
Appeal Are Not Barred by Res Judicata 
The State argues that the district court properly dismissed the unobjected-to prosecutorial 
misconduct claim that had been previously addressed as fundamental error in the direct appeal. 
The State argues that the Court held that any error was harmless; i.e., Severson was not 
prejudiced. Accordingly, it argues that the issue of prejudice, a required element of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, has been previously decided. We are not persuaded. 
The Idaho Supreme Court did not dispose of Severson's claim based upon harmless error, 
but concluded that he failed to show fundamental error. Severson' s direct appeal was decided 
before the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the fundamental error standard in State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,214,245 P.3d 961, 966 (2010). 3 In Severson, the Court considered a statement by the 
prosecutor to be fundamental error if it went "to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights 
or . . . to the foundation of the case or take[ s] from the defendant a right which was essential to 
his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Severson, 147 Idaho at 
716,215 P.3d at 436.4 
Before applying the principles of res judicata in a post-conviction case, we will consider 
the legal standard applicable in the prior adjudication. Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440, 163 P.3d at 
229. If the standard applicable in the prior action was more stringent, the difference in standard 
will not preclude the application of res judicata. Id. However, if the standard applicable to the 
prior action was less stringent, we cannot apply the principle of res judicata. See id. For 
example, if a fact was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, one can infer the fact was also proven 
3 Accordingly, we do not consider the preclusive effect of a fundamental error ruling under 
the Perry standard. But see and compare State v. Parker,_ Idaho_, _ P.3d _ (Aug. 6, 
2014) (a recent case decided by the Idaho Supreme Court dealing with unobjected-to 
"prosecutorial misconduct" reviewed for fundamental error, including misconduct in 
commenting on defendant's invocation of this right to silence, and harmless error). 
4 We note that to be "harmless error" within this context, a court must be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached by the jury had the 
prosecutorial misconduct not occurred. 
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by a preponderance of evidence. Conversely, if a fact was proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, one cannot infer that the fact was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
To the extent the prior fundamental error standard included a determination of prejudice, 
that standard would be far more exacting than the standard under which the prejudice prong of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is adjudicated. Compare Severson, 147 Idaho at 716,215 
P.3d at 436 (error must go "to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or . . . to the 
foundation of the case") with Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1178 ("a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different"). Indeed, the disposition of Severson highlights the stringency of that standard. 
Although it noted that certain comments were improper or arguably improper, it held that none 
were so egregious that they amounted to fundamental error. Severson, 14 7 Idaho at 720, 215 
P.3d at 440. This case is analogous to one in which a plaintiff failed to prove a claim beyond a 
reasonable doubt, an exacting standard. Such failure of proof may not be res judicata in a 
subsequent case where the burden of proof is lower. 
Accordingly, a determination that a comment was not fundamental error, under the 
standard used in Severson, has no preclusive effect because the issue is not identical. See Ticor 
Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 (issue preclusion applies only when "the issue 
decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action"); 
Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440, 163 P .3d at 229 ( considering the applicable legal standard to 
determine when res judicata applies). For the reasons stated above, the ineffective assistance 
claim referencing these statements is not barred by res judicata. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that any claim arising from statements that were not addressed by the 
majority on the direct appeal is not barred as res judicata. Likewise, issues decided pursuant to 
the prior fundamental error standard applied in the direct appeal are not barred. Accordingly, we 
reverse the order of the district court granting summary dismissal and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
5 We note that the State's motion for summary dismissal asserted alternative grounds for 
relief. The viability of those claims may be raised anew upon remand. 
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